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THE NEW "ILLEGITIMATE CHILD": HOW
PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS ARE IMPUTING
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS TO
CHILDREN OF HOMOSEXUAL PARENTS AND
GETTING AWAY WITH IT
DANIEL MAKOFSKY*
INTRODUCTION
In the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus rebuked his disciples for turning
children away from him, saying "[let the little children come to me, and do
not hinder them, for the kingdom of heaven belongs to such as these.",
Jesus' special love for children is further emphasized in Matthew chapter
18 where Jesus instructs his disciples, "I tell you the truth, unless you
change and become like little children you will never enter the kingdom of
heaven. Therefore, whoever humbles himself like this child is the greatest
in the kingdom of heaven." Jesus continues by instructing, "[s]ee that you
do not despise one of these little ones. For I tell you that in heaven their
angels always see the face of my Father who is in heaven." 2 The message
here is about inclusion; God's love is not only for those people advanced in
wisdom and knowledge, rather it is for those who come before God as a
child, bearing humility and purity.
This message of God's inclusive love was recently disregarded by a
parochial school in Hingham, Massachusetts when it excluded an 8-year
old boy from the school after learning that the child's parents were
lesbian.3 This was not the first occurrence of such an incident; months
* J.D., 2012, St. John's University School of Law. I want to thank Professor Nina Crimm for her
support throughout the writing of this article; her insight, editorial feedback, and scholarship in this area
allowed me to develop my ideas into this final product. I also want to thank Rosemary LaSala for
helping me with the research.
1 Matthew 19:14 (New International).
2 Matthew 18:10 (New International).
3 Lisa Wangsness, 2 Views on Excluding Lesbians' Son; Archdiocese Distances self from School
Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 2010, at metro 1, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/education/k12/articles/2010/05/13/studentsexclusiondrawsdenial/.
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earlier in Boulder, Colorado a parochial elementary school did not allow
one of its pre-school students to return the following year after discovering
that the child's parents were lesbian. 4
From a legal standpoint, this scenario raises the grave concern of an
individual being treated unequally based on another's behavior.
Discrimination rooted in the disapproval of an individual's behavior raises
a moral dilemma. Its imputation to another person is morally reprehensible,
especially when imputed to a minor child. From a theological standpoint,
these discriminatory practices fall out of line with Jesus's teachings of an
inclusive love that eagerly welcomes children. The legal and theological
discussions surrounding this topic differ. However, regardless of the forum,
it is clear that the extension of discrimination to innocent children within
society is a complex matter that has neither a clear moral or legal solution.
This Note presents the legal discussion and takes the position that
discrimination against innocent children because of the sexual orientation
of their parents is immoral, contrary to fundamental public policy and
therefore deserves a legal remedy.
I. THE SEARCH FOR A LEGAL REMEDY
So what does the family do? For illustrative purposes this Note explores
the possible options of four hypothetical families from different states:
California, New York, Massachusetts, and Texas. Each family has a
common experience. After sending its 10-year old child to public school
for elementary school, each decided that its child would benefit
educationally and spiritually by attending a parochial school. The family
has limited options so it applied to the only parochial middle school in
town. During the course of the admissions process, the school's
administrators discovered that the parents are homosexual and accordingly
denied the child admission. The decision was based on the school's
position that homosexual relationships are in discord with the teachings of
4 Sarah Netter, Colorado Catholic School Boots Student With Lesbian Mothers, ABC NEWS, (Mar.
9, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/colorado-catholic-school-kicks-student-lesbian-
mothers/story?id=10043528. These incidents are not indicative of a uniform policy of the Catholic
Church. In fact, in the wake of the parochial school's decision in Hingham, the Archdiocese of Boston
issued a statement that the school was not following archdiocesan policy. Additionally, several months
later, the Archdiocese issued a new admissions policy that said "parochial schools will not
"discriminate against or exclude any categories of students." The disconnect between the Archdiocese
and the parochial school on this matter stems from the fact that individual parochial schools are given
authority to make admission decisions. The decision to exclude a child can be made if the local parish
deems it in the best interest of the child to do so. Therefore, this is an issue that has the potential to
recur. Wangsness, supra note 3.
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the Catholic Church, and that teachers in the school would be placed in an
awkward position by having to answer questions about a child's same sex
parents.s Each family is unsatisfied and seeks a legal remedy.
Currently, the law does not adequately provide a remedy for this
discrimination. The families' possible legal protections under the U.S.
Constitution, their state constitutions, federal anti-discrimination laws, and
state anti-discrimination laws are insufficient to stop the parochial schools'
discriminatory actions. The U.S. Constitution only protects individuals
from state actors, not private entities. Although some state constitutions
extend beyond the U.S. Constitution in prohibiting discrimination and
protecting individual liberties, like the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions
are restricted by state action requirements. Federal anti-discrimination laws
fail because these children do not fit into any of the federally protected
classes. State anti-discrimination laws also fail because even though some
states prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, there are other obstacles
that limit the reach of anti-discrimination law to parochial schools.
This Note sets out two alternative paths to securing a legal remedy. The
first path, a more immediate albeit incomplete solution, is to seek the
revocation of a discriminatory parochial school's 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
status.6 Pursuant to this path, the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter
"I.R.S.") might revoke the tax-exempt status of the parochial school where
it can demonstrate that the school's activities are contrary to fundamental
public policy. This Note applies the Supreme Court's analysis in Bob Jones
University v. United States7 to argue that the revocation of a parochial
school's tax-exempt status might be a possible way to combat the school's
discrimination against children of homosexual parent(s). Revocation of the
parochial school's tax-exempt status may not compel the school to stop
discriminating; however, it will ensure that the opportunity for a dual tax
subsidy - tax-exemption of the school's revenues and tax deductions for
donors - is no longer available to subsidize the school's discrimination. 8
This approach may have the effect of reducing donations, thereby
undermining the school's funding, 9 in turn putting pressure on the
5 David Gibson, Children of Gay Parents: Another Student Booted From Catholic School,
POLITICSDAILY, (May 14, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/05/14/children-of-gay-parents-
another-student-booted-from-catholic-sc/; Netter, supra note 4.
6 See I.R.C. 501(c)(3). Parochial schools receive indirect aid from the federal government through a
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
7 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
8 See infra discussion, at Part II. B.
9 See I.R.C. 170(c)(2). When an organization loses its tax-exempt status, donors can no longer
claim § 170 deductions for the donations that they make to that organization. Therefore, an
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parochial school to change its discriminatory policy in an effort to prevent
the loss of revenue.10
Notwithstanding the potential success of this approach, two limitations
must be conceded. First, this path has only been used against educational
organizations practicing racial discrimination, a form of discrimination the
Court found to be contrary to fundamental public policy.1" Therefore in
order to succeed in this context, it must be demonstrated that discrimination
of children from non-traditional families is a violation of fundamental
public policy. Second, this approach presents a standing issue. Because the
I.R.S. has sole authority to revoke an organization's tax-exempt status,
where the I.R.S. does not act affirmatively, a party must gain standing to
enjoin the I.R.S. from maintaining an organization's tax-exempt status.
This task is increasingly difficult in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn. 12 This
Note presents an argument to overcome the first limitation. With respect to
the standing limitation, this Note concedes that a family's chance of
achieving standing to challenge a third party's Federal tax-exempt status is
doubtful. Accordingly, the most practical solution is for Congress to enact a
new law that will compel the I.R.S. to affirmatively revoke an
organization's tax-exempt status where such organization's policies and
practices violate fundamental public policy.
The first path's perhaps insuperable limitations demonstrate the great
need for a complete remedy. Accordingly, this Note proposes a second
solution: new federal legislation that includes children of non-traditional
families as a protected class under federal law. At present, the prospect of
such legislation is idealistic, but nevertheless a goal to strive toward. This
legislation is necessary for two additional reasons: first, there is currently
no law that forbids religious organizations from imputing discrimination of
an adult to the adult's minor child;13 and second, there is a lack of
uniformity among the states' anti-discrimination laws.14
Part I discusses the families' constitutional, federal and state anti-
organization's loss of tax-exempt status also takes away a major incentive for people to donate money
to that organization.
10 Russell J. Upton, Bob Jonesing Baden-Powell: Fighting the Boy Scouts of America's
Discriminatory Practices by Revoking its State-level Tax-exempt Status, 50 AM. U.L. REv. 793, 800-01
(2001); Russell J. Upton, A Sensible Alternative to Revoking the Boy Scouts' Tax Exemption, 30 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 137, 141 (2002).
11 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 574.
12 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011).
13 See infra discussion Part I.B-C.
14 See infra discussion Part I.D.
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discrimination law arguments, ultimately explaining why each do not
prevent the schools' discriminatory practices. This Part follows with a
discussion of the parochial schools' First Amendment defenses, addressing
constitutional protections the schools might have. Part II discusses the
history and theory behind fighting discrimination through the revocation of
tax-exempt status. This Part also addresses the obstacles that a family faces
when seeking to have the I.R.S. revoke a religious organization's tax-
exempt status, hence demonstrating why Congress needs to adopt new
legislation that would prompt greater scrutiny over organizations that
receive tax-exempt status. Part III presents a proposal for new federal
legislation that would provide the most complete solution for challenging a
parochial school's discrimination of children of homosexual parent(s).
II. WHY CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW CLAIMS FALL
SHORT
A. United States Constitutional Arguments
The families from California, New York, Massachusetts, and Texas are
each guaranteed the same liberties and protections under the United States
Constitution. Possible constitutional arguments for these families include
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,
and the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion.15
However, before delving into the merits of these constitutional arguments,
a preliminary question must be examined: does the U.S. Constitution apply
to parochial schools? The Constitution applies only to state action;
therefore unless the parochial school fits into an exception from that
general premise, the Constitution will not protect these families. 16 The
Supreme Court has qualified the state action requirement with two
exceptions: public function and entanglement.
The public function exception provides that when private conduct
involves a task that has traditionally been exercised exclusively by the
state, that conduct must comply with the Constitution.17 Education has long
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall deprive any
person within its jurisdiction the Equal Protection of the laws.
16 United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 507 (Aspen Publishers 3rd ed. 2006).
17 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (holding that a private utility company
did not have to provide due process before it terminated a customer's service because running a utility
is not a traditional prerogative of the State, and therefore the Constitution did not apply);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 517.
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been a function of the government, and there is a strong argument that a
private school is performing a public function by providing a secular
education to children. 18 The Court however, has limited the application of
the public function exception in this area by asking whether providing
education has been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state." 19
The Court's response was simply "no" because private schools have long
existed alongside public education. 20
The entanglement exception provides that where the government
affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates unconstitutional
conduct, the Constitution applies. 2 1 Whether the government is entangled
in a given situation turns on the degree of government involvement in the
private activity. 22 In the context of parochial schools, entanglement is
determined by the amount of financial support or other government
resources granted to the school. In making this determination, the Supreme
Court has reached different conclusions. These differences show that the
Court is more likely to find entanglement where it is apparent that the
government is supporting a private actor for the purpose of undermining
constitutional protections. In Norwood v. Harrison, the Court held that
there was state action when the government gave free textbooks to private
schools that engaged in racial discrimination 23; however, in Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, the Court held that there was no state action when a private
school, receiving 90 percent of its funds from the state, fired a teacher
because of her speech activities.24
If the Court finds that the government is supporting a parochial school
for the purpose of undermining the equal protection rights of a child of
homosexual parents, the Court would likely find state action with a lesser
degree of entanglement. Accordingly, two questions remain: first, what is
the degree of government support to the parochial school? Second, is the
government supporting that parochial school for the purpose of
undermining the child's constitutional rights? The answers to these
questions are fact specific and require an in-depth examination of the
18 Bd. of Ed. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. I v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 16, at 524-25. Parochial schools are unique from other religious schools because the curriculum at
a parochial school provides secular education along with religious education, as compared to a school
that provides solely religious education.
19 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
20 Id. at 842-43.
21 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 517, 527.
22 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 527.
23 413 U.S. 455, 463 (1973).
24 457 U.S. at 837.
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state's intentions for supporting the parochial school.
Although it is uncertain whether these parochial schools would fall
within the entanglement exception to the state action requirement,
articulation of the Fourteenth Amendment Clauses is important because
they influence the broader definitions of equality and individual liberty. A
brief discussion of these provisions illuminates the underlying principles
throughout this Note.
a. The Child's Equal Protection Rights
The Equal Protection Clause comes into play where a state action,
policy, or law creates classifications among people and then withholds
certain rights or benefits based on those classifications. 25 Where the
parochial school denied admission to a 10-year old child because of that
child's homosexual parent(s), that school is treating children of
homosexual parents differently than those of heterosexual parents, thereby
creating a classification. This discriminatory policy can be described in two
ways: either homosexual families are being treated differently than
heterosexual families, or children not born or adopted into traditional
families are being treated differently than children born into traditional
families. The Supreme Court has dealt with both types of discrimination.
The Supreme Court has addressed controversies involving discrimination
against children not born or adopted into traditional families in the Equal
Protection context of non-marital children. 26 These claims challenged the
constitutionality of laws that denied non-marital children equal rights in the
areas of wrongful death damages, the rights of fathers, financial assistance
from state benefits, financial assistance from federal benefits, inheritance,
paternity and support actions, and immigration. 27 Claimants in these cases
argued that the government did not have an important interest in denying
children of non-married parents the same rights as children of married
parents. The Supreme Court in Clark v. Jeter endorsed the application of
intermediate scrutiny to discrimination against non-marital children, and
held that such classifications violated the Equal Protection Clause.28 The
Court condemned the state for punishing children of non-married parents
25 United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2008); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at
669.
26 Between 1968 and 1992, the Supreme Court adjudicated over twenty cases involving Equal
Protection claims of non-marital children, MARTHA T. ZINGO & KEVIN E. EARLY, NAMELESS PERSONS:
LEGAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-MARITAL CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (1994).
27 Id
28 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
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for a birth status beyond their control. 29
The treatment of sexual orientation under Equal Protection jurisprudence
has received increased attention after the Supreme Court's decisions in
Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas. In Romer the Supreme Court held
that a Colorado referendum repealing all state and local laws prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 30 This case is extremely significant because the Court struck down
a law using the rational basis test. Because the rational basis test only
requires that the classification rationally advances a legitimate state
objective, 31 the Court's analysis reveals that a more rigorous rational basis
standard was applied.32 Although the Court did not expressly apply a
heightened level of scrutiny to the sexual orientation classification, the
Court's application of a more rigorous rational basis standard leaves open-
ended the future treatment of sexual orientation as a suspect class. In
Lawrence v. Taylor, the Supreme Court struck down a criminal sodomy
law holding that intimate consensual sexual conduct was part of the liberty
protected by substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 33
Even though this case was not decided on Equal Protection grounds, there
is reason to believe that the Court's decision calls into question and
challenges other limits on same-sex equality, including same-sex
marriage. 34
Although the future of how the Court will treat sexual orientation is not
clear after Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Taylor, rational basis remains
the standard of review for sexual orientation discrimination. Based on the
current state of equal protection jurisprudence, a family has a stronger
argument that the discrimination its child suffered puts them in the same
classification as non-marital children. The Court applies a higher degree of
29 Id. (stating "we have invalidated classifications that burden illegitimate children for the sake of
punishing the illicit relations of their parents, because 'visiting this condemnation on the head of an
infant is illogical and unjust."').
30 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
31 Idat631.
32 Id. Under traditional rational basis review, the party challenging a state action or law must
demonstrate that the law is not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. The traditional
application of this standard represents a very high bar for finding a law unconstitutional. The fact that
the Romer Court held that the Colorado referendum did not even pass the rational basis standard
suggests that the Court applied a rational basis test with "bite." See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal
Protection, 124 HARv. L. REV. 747, 777 (2011).
33 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
34 David S. Buckel, Building Marriage Equality with Lawrence v. Texas, LAMBDA LEGAL, Mar.
29, 2008, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20081120080530/http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-
work/publications/general/building-marriage-equality.htm. See Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the
Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1184, 1185 (2004).
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scrutiny to laws and practices that discriminate against children for the
actions of their parents than to laws that create classifications on the basis
of sexual orientation classification. 35
b. The Parent's Substantive Due Process Clause
The Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska held that the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right
to "acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience," 36 and the right to "send one's children to a private school that
offers specialized training." 37 Accordingly, parents have a constitutional
right to send their child to a private school where that child will receive
religious instruction. Once again, the Constitution only protects this right
from government interference, not the interference of a private actor such
as a parochial school. Thus, the Constitution does not prevent a parochial
school from denying a parent the right to bring up its child as they see fit.
c. The Parent's First Amendment Free Exercise Rights
A parent has a First Amendment right to guide the religious future and
education of his or her children. 38 Arguably, this right is infringed upon
when the parochial school denies its child admission. The child is being
excluded from a religious community, and accordingly the parent's
fundamental interest in controlling the religious future and education of his
or her child is violated. This argument is deficient for two reasons. First, a
parochial school is not a state actor and therefore is not obligated to respect
a person's free exercise rights. A parochial school's discriminatory
admissions policy is not the equivalent of a state regulation that interferes
with an individual's free exercise right. Second, this argument is based on
the misleading assumption that the family's only way to direct the religious
future of its child is to send him or her to a parochial school. This ignores
35 Compare Jeter, 468 U.S. 456, 461 (applying intermediate scrutiny to an equal protection claim
based on the non-marital classification) with Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (using the rational basis
standard to an equal protection claim based on a sexual orientation classification).
36 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (ruling that a parent's right to direct the
upbringing and education of their child includes the right to send a child to a school in order to receive
instruction in the German language).
37 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (referencing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390).
38 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (holding that the state may not prevent Amish
parents from taking their children out of school before they reach the age of sixteen because the parent's
religious right to free exercise outweighed the states interest in education); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (stating that the state may not ban private schools).
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the possibility that a parent can supplement a purely secular education with
religious education at a Sunday school or other church program.
B. States' Constitutional Arguments
In addition to each family's constitutional rights under the U.S.
Constitution, each family enjoys protections under its respective state
constitution. At a minimum, the protections offered by state constitutions
match those of the U.S Constitution, and in some states, extend beyond
those guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution. 39 As under the U.S. Constitution,
the families might look for protection under their respective state
constitutions' freedom of religion provisions, Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses, or any other applicable provision unique to their state's
constitution. Despite room for greater protection under these state
constitutional provisions, it must be acknowledged that the role of state
constitutions is to define the powers of its state's government and to protect
an individual's rights from abuse by that state government. Accordingly,
parochial schools will only be restricted by a state constitution if the
parochial school is a state actor, or if the particular state constitution has an
applicable provision that does not have a state action requirement. A look
at New York and California's constitutions demonstrates the limited ability
of state constitutions to protect against the parochial school's
discriminatory actions.
The New York family might look for protection under New York
Constitution's Due Process, 40 Equal Protection,41 or Civil Rights clauses.42
New York's Equal Protection clause has not been interpreted to extend
beyond the reach of the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection clause;43
39 Jon J. Aho, High Court Study: A Case of Good Intentions: The Vermont Supreme Court and
State Constitutional Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1845, 1846 (1997)
(describing how the framers designed the United States Constitution to set only minimum standards for
individual rights and liberties and envisioned the states, through their own state constitutions, as the
primary protectors of individual rights and liberties); see Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in
Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 399, 401 (1987) ("The [Founder's] contemplation was
that the states would remain the principal protectors of individual rights- 'the immediate and visible
guardian of life and property' (quoting The Federalist No. 17, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke
ed. 1961)).
40 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.").
41 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof.").
42 Id. ("No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any
discrimination in his or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or
by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.").
43 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 87 N.E.2d 541, 548 (N.Y. 1949) (stating that New York's
Equal Protection Clause "is no more broad in coverage than its Federal prototype, which reads: 'No
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however, New York courts do have the authority under the state Due
Process clause to impose higher standards than those held to be necessary
by the U.S. Constitution. 44 Despite room for greater protection under New
York's Due Process clause, New York's Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses are limited by the state action requirement. 45 The state action
requirement attached to New York's Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses was addressed in Oefelein v. Monsignor Farrell High School.46 In
that case, the plaintiff claimed that his Due Process and Equal Protection
rights under both the federal and state constitutions were violated when he
was expelled from his parochial high school without receiving a hearing.47
The court dismissed the claim, finding that the parochial school was not a
state actor despite the existence of several state contacts.48 The court's
decision demonstrates unwillingness to extend due process and equal
protection rights into parochial schools.
New York's Civil Rights Clause, unlike the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses, does not have a state action requirement.49 As explained
in People v. Kern, section 11 of article I of New York's constitution
contains both New York's Equal Protection and Civil Rights clauses,
however, only the Equal Protection clause is addressed to "state action."50
The Civil Rights clause prohibits private as well as state discrimination as
to "civil rights."51 This clause however, is not self-executing, and its
prohibition against discrimination applies only to civil rights, which are
elsewhere declared by Constitution, statute, or common law. 52 In order for
State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' This conclusion
follows from the plain meaning of plain words").
44 People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82 (N.Y. 1978); So Chun, A Decade After Smith: an
Examination of the New York Court of Appeals' Stance on the Free Exercise of Religion in Relation to
Minnesota, Washington, and California, 63 ALB. L. REv. 1305, 1310 (2000) (describing that "when a
state interprets its constitution, the state must take into account its unique history, socioeconomic and
demographic needs, local desires and interests, and the public attitudes of the state's citizens.").
45 Dorsey, 87 N.E.2d at 548; Ryan v. Hofstra University, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964, 977-78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1971); Oefelein v. Monsignor Farrell High School, 353 N.Y.S.2d 674, 675 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
46 Oefelein, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 675. The school's state contacts included: 1) the school was chartered by the State and was
required to provide an education substantially equivalent to that provided by public schools; 2) state
regents examinations were given; 3) the school's real property was tax-exempt; and 4) secular text
books were supplied by the State because the school performs a public purpose.
49 People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1241 (N.Y. 1990); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillax, Inc., 379
N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (N.Y. 1978).
50 Kern, 554 N.E.2d at 1241 (stating "[t]he term 'civil rights' was understood by the delegates at
the 1938 Constitutional Convention to mean 'those rights which appertain to a person by virtue of his
citizenship in a state or community."').
51 Id.; Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 87 N.E.2d 541, 548 (N.Y. 1949).
52 Kern, 554 N.E.2d at 1241; Dorsey, 87 N.E.2d at 548.
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a family to successfully claim that a parochial school violated New York's
Civil Rights Clause they would have to point to a violation of a specific
civil right. Nevertheless, even if the family could point to a declared civil
right that covers the family's right to send its child to a parochial school,
the Civil Rights Clause only protects against discrimination on the basis of
race, color, creed or religion. 53 Because the discrimination was not on
account of any of these four grounds, the Civil Rights Clause will not
protect the family from the parochial school's discrimination.
The California family will look to its Constitution's Unalienable Rights
provision,54 Due Process and Equal Protection clauses for protection. 55
Under California's Due Process and Equal Protection clauses there is no
explicit state action requirement. 56 However, despite the absence of an
explicit requirement, the Supreme Court of California in Gay Law Students
Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. stated that "the history of the
constitutional provision offered no suggestion that the provision was
intended to apply broadly to all purely private conduct."57 In light of this
history, California courts have implied a state action requirement into the
state's Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, but have taken a lenient
approach.58 The court exercised this leniency in Gay Law Students Ass'n
by allowing an action against a utility company for denying homosexuals
equal opportunity to work in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
California Constitution.59 Despite California's willingness to extend its
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses to private actors, there have been
no cases where California has extended the Equal Protection or Due
Process clauses of California's Constitution to protect against a parochial
school's discriminatory admission practices.
California's Unalienable Rights provision allows privacy actions without
53 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
54 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
55 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law or denied equal protection of the laws . . . .").
56 Id; Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 598 (Cal. 1979).
57 Gay Law Students Ass'n, 595 P.2d at 598; Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 450 (Cal.
1974) ("To construe [California's Due Process clause] to apply to private action would involve a
judicial innovation which, as of this date, is without precedent.").
58 Gay Law Students Ass'n, 595 P.2d at 598 (stating that in interpreting the scope of the Due
Process clause under the state Constitution, we are not bound by federal decisions analyzing the state
action requirement under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments); see Ivo Becica, Privacy-State
Constitutional Privacy Rights Against Private Employers: A "Hairy" Issue in Alaska, 37 RUTGERS L.J.
1235, 1238 (2006) (examining Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 102 P.3d 282 (Alaska 2004), to explain how
state courts, including California courts, have used their power to weaken or eliminate the state action
requirement in several contexts other than privacy, including free speech and the right to assemble,
equal protection, and due process).
59 Gay Law Students Ass'n, 595 P.2d at 598-600.
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a showing of state action.60 This provision provides that "[a]ll people are
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among those
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
privacy." 61 Among the rights enumerated, only the right to enjoy and
defend life and liberty is applicable. Therefore, in making a claim under
this provision, the family might assert that the parochial school's
discriminatory admission practices infringe on the family's liberty interest
to direct the education and religion of its child.62 This is essentially the
same argument made under the U.S. Constitution's Free Exercise and Due
Process clauses. Even though the state action requirement is absent here,
the family will face the same challenge of having to demonstrate that the
discriminatory practice of one parochial school denied its right to direct the
religious future and education of its child. The family's access to secular
educational opportunities and other sources of religious education make the
chances of succeeding on this argument unlikely.
The family's chance of securing protection under their states'
constitution is dubious at best. The first explanation for this forecast is the
state action requirement. Although states are not obligated to follow federal
court's application of the state action requirement, there is nonetheless an
adherence to the construction that the constitution should not govern
private actors. The second explanation is what some commentators
describe as constitutional law's diminished role in the fight against
discrimination. 63 This position is based on the realization that state and
federal anti-discrimination legislation has become a more effective tool in
mandating equal treatment of disfavored classes. 64 Anti-discrimination
laws are preferable because they often impose greater restrictions on
private actors than the Constitution would impose if the actors were a state
actor.65
60 Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) ("[T]he Privacy Initiative in article I,
section I of the California Constitution creates a right of action against private as well as government
entities."); Becica, supra note 57, at 1239.
61 CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 1.
62 See Meyer v. Nebraksa, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
63 See John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on State
Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 821-22
(1990); see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that constitutional
right to free speech superseded a city's ability to bar discriminatory activity with too broad a brush, in
that case a ban on burning a cross in the yard of an African American family).
64 Devlin, supra note 63, at 871; M. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-
1860, 4-30 (1977).
65 David A. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice, and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope of
Civil Rights Laws to Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 B.Y.U.L. REv. 167, 180-81 (2001)
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C. Federal Anti-discrimination Law Arguments
The four families' next option would be to explore federal anti-
discrimination law. Unlike constitutional law, federal anti-discrimination
law extends to private actors. 66 Federal anti-discrimination law provides
different degrees of protection depending on the forum in which the
discrimination is taking place, and provides either absolute or no protection
at all depending on the basis of the discrimination. The forums that federal
anti-discrimination laws cover include: voting rights, access to public
facilities and accommodations, discrimination in education, discrimination
within federally assisted programs, discrimination in employment, 67 and
discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. 68 Federal anti-
discrimination laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
national origin, sex, 69 age, 70 and disability. 71
For our hypothetical families, the discrimination can be described as
taking place in the forum of education, federally assisted programs, or in
the enforcement of contracts. The discrimination can be defined either on
the basis of sexual orientation or being a child in a non-traditional family.
Unfortunately, these forms of discrimination are not covered by federal
anti-discrimination law.72
In sum, although Congress has enacted laws that combat discrimination
on many fronts within the private sector, no federal law has been enacted to
(explaining how "certain civil rights statutes extend constitutional-like protections to 'forms of
discrimination not covered in any meaningful way by the Constitution such as discrimination based on
age or disability. Also, civil rights statutes often broaden the substantive principles governing
discrimination,' by allowing claims to be based upon disparate impact, rather than proof of
discriminatory intent. Thus, civil rights statutes arguably provide greater protections against civil rights
violations than the Constitution."); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COL. LAW
REv. 1367, 1474 (2003).
66 Karen Lim, Freedom To Exclude After Boy Scouts Of America V Dale: Do Private Schools
Have A Right To Discriminate Against Homosexual Teachers?, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2599, 2607
(2003). The catalyst for a large portion of our federal anti-discrimination law which was enacted
through the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the civil rights movement. Congress' goal for this legislation
was to extend the values of equality to private actors; David A. Brennen, Charities and the
Constitution: Evaluating the Role of Constitutional Principles in Determining the Scope of Tax Law's
Public Policy Limitation for Charities, 5 FLA. TAX REv. 779, 791 (2002).
67 See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 199 (1988).
68 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
69 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
70 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
71 42 U.S.C.§ 12112 (1994).
72 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42
USC § 2000d - 2000d-4A; William Sung, Taking the Fight Back to Title VIl: A Case for Redefining
"Because of Sex" to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL.
L. REv. 487, 493 (2011).
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provide protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
or being a child in a homosexual family. 73
D. States'Anti-Discrimination Law Arguments
a. Sexual Orientation as a Protected Class under State Law
Among the fifty states, the treatment of sexual orientation as a protected
class under state law varies from no protection at all, to broad protection.74
Thus for the four families involved, success will depend largely on the state
where they reside. In the area of employment, 22 states and the District of
Columbia prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. 75 In the area
of education, 14 states and the District of Columbia have laws that address
discrimination, harassment and/or bullying on the basis of sexual
orientation. 76 This section explores the state anti-discrimination laws where
the families reside.
In California, state law provides protection for homosexuals in
employment and public accommodations. 77 The applicable statute provides
that all persons within the state, regardless of his or her sexual orientation,
are free and equal, and entitled to full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever.78 The face of this statute seems to offer broad
protection to homosexuals against discrimination by private actors. The
73 J. Banning Jasiunas, Is ENDA the Answer?Can a "Separate but Equal" Federal Statute
Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination? 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1529, 1535
(2000); Lim, supra note 66, at 2608.
74 See generally Equality from State to State (Human Rights Campaign Found., Wash., D.C.), Dec.
2009 (hereinafter "Equality from State to State) available at
http://www.hrc.org/documents/HRCStatesReport_09.pdf.; Institute of Real Estate Management,
Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, at 6-7, July 2007
(hereinafter "Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation") available at
http://www.irem.org/pdfs/publicpolicy/Anti-discrimination.pdf.
75 Equality from State to State, supra note 74, at 15. As of December 2009, the states that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation within employment include: California (1992, 2003),
Colorado (2007), Connecticut (1991), Delaware (2009), District of Columbia (1977, 2006), Hawaii
(1991), Illinois (2006), Iowa (2006), Kentucky (2008), Maine (2005), Maryland (2001, 2007),
Massachusetts (1989), Minnesota (1993), New Jersey (1992, 2007), New Hampshire (1998), New
Mexico (2003), New York (2003), Nevada (1999), Oregon (2008), Rhode Island (1995, 2001), Vermont
(1991, 2007), Wisconsin (1982), and Washington (2006); Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Based on
Sexual Orientation, supra note 74, at 3-4.
76 Equality from State to State, supra note 74, at 19. As of December 2009, the states that address
discrimination of students on the basis of sexual orientation include: California (2002), Connecticut
(2001), District of Columbia (2001), Iowa (2007), Maine (2005), Maryland (2008), Massachusetts
(2002), Minnesota (1993), New Jersey (2002), New York (2003), North Carolina (2009), Oregon
(2007), Vermont (2001/2007), Washington (2002/2009), and Wisconsin (2001).
77 Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West 2012).
78 Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b) (West 2012).
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question, however, is whether this statute has enough reach to extend to a
parochial school that exercises discriminatory practices against
homosexuals. This question was answered by a California Intermediate
Court in Doe v. California Lutheran High School Assn. 79 This case
addressed a claim against a Lutheran high school brought by two teenage
girls who were expelled for displaying lesbian behavior.80 The issue came
down to whether the school was a "business enterprise" for purposes of
California's anti-discrimination law dealing with public accommodations.81
The court ultimately concluded that the school did not fall under the statute
because the school "is an expressive social organization whose primary
function is the inculcation of values in its youth members." 82 The court
agreed that where "a private nonprofit religious school has as its 'overall
purpose and function' the education of children in keeping with its
religious beliefs, the 'inculcation of a specific set of values,' with programs
'designed to teach the moral principles to which the [school] subscribes,'
prevents such a school from being considered a 'business establishment'
whose student admission practices would be subject to the Act." 83 The
court's narrow interpretation of California's anti-discrimination law
represents the complexities of applying anti-discrimination laws to
religious institutions, especially when the discrimination is based on sexual
orientation.
Our next family lives in New York, a state that prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation in employment, private housing, public
accommodations, credit, and education.84 The applicable section of New
York's anti-discrimination is New York Executive Law, Article 15 Human
Rights Law § 296(4), which provides,
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an education
corporation or association which holds itself out to the public to be
non-sectarian and exempt from taxation pursuant to the provisions of
article four of the real property tax law to deny the use of its facilities
to any person otherwise qualified, or to permit the harassment of any
student or applicant, by reason of his race, color, religion, disability,
national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, age or marital
status, except that any such institution which establishes or maintains
79 170 Cal. App. 4b 828 (2009).
80 Id. at 830.
81 Id. at 834.
82 Id. at 838.
83 Id. at 839.
84 N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 2010).
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a policy of educating persons of one sex exclusively may admit
students of only one sex.
Although the statute applies to educational institutions, it only applies to
those that "hold itself out to the public to be non-sectarian and exempt from
taxation pursuant . . . ." Thus, by definition, this statute does not extend to
parochial schools. In fact the legislature's intent to exclude religious
organizations from the general purview of this statute is expressly stated in
section 296(11) of Article 15 of New York Executive Law, which provides
religious institutions the freedom to take such actions "calculated by such
organizations to promote the religious principles for which it is established
or maintained." 85 Under this language, it would appear that a parochial
school is permitted to exclude a child of homosexual parents if such an
action is necessary to promote the school's religious position against
homosexuality.
The third family is from Massachusetts, a state that was at the forefront
of expanding anti-discrimination law to include sexual orientation. 86
Massachusetts, like New York, prohibits discrimination based on sexual
orientation in employment, public accommodations, housing,87 and public
education. 88 Despite this state's strict prohibition of discrimination based
on sexual orientation, 89 there is no provision that extends such protection to
private schools. With the exception of Massachusetts' anti-bullying law
85 NY Exec. Law § 296 (11) (McKinney 2010). This section of the statute provides, "[n]othing
contained in this section shall be construed to bar any religious or denominational institution or
organization, or any organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated,
supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, from limiting employment or
sales or rental of housing accommodations or admission to or giving preference to persons of the same
religion or denomination or from taking such action as is calculated by such organization to promote the
religious principles for which it is established or maintained."; Scheiber v. St. John's Univ., 600
N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
86 See generally Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 15 lB (LexisNexis 2012). In 1989 Massachusetts became the
second state in the country to pass a comprehensive anti-discrimination law prohibiting sexual law
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the areas of employment, housing, public
accommodations, credit and services; Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1625, 1626 (1996).
87 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151B (LexisNexis 2012); Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Based on
Sexual Orientation, supra note 75, at 6.
88 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 76 § 5. The Massachusetts statute covering discrimination within public
education provides, "[e]very person shall have a right to attend the public schools of the town where he
actually resides, subject to the following section. No school committee is required to enroll a person
who does not actually reside in the town unless said enrollment is authorized by law or by the school
committee. Any person who violates or assists in the violation of this provision may be required to
remit full restitution to the town of the improperly-attended public schools. No person shall be excluded
from or discriminated against in admission to a public school of any town, or in obtaining the
advantages, privileges and courses of study of such public school on account of race, color, sex,
religion, national origin or sexual orientation."
89 See THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL MARTHA COAKLEY, GUIDE TO CIVIL RIGHTS IN
SCHOOLS, available at http://my.mass.gov/Cago/docs/civilrights/civil rights._schools-singlepage.pdf.
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passed in May 2010, the legal rights and protections for students
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation reach only public schools. 90
The final family is from Texas, a state that represents a majority of states
in this country that afford little protection from discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation. Texas' anti-discrimination law prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
disability, sex, or age within employment and housing and not beyond. 91
The survey of anti-discrimination law in these four states demonstrates
the difficulty families in this situation face. California, New York, and
Massachusetts are states on the liberal end of the social and political
spectrum, yet even these states provide no statutory prohibition against
discrimination of children from homosexual families that extend to
parochial schools.
E. Parochial Schools' First Amendment Rights
A discussion of each family's legal argument is not complete without
addressing the parochial school's First Amendment defenses. There is a
tension between the expanding definition of equality on the basis of race,
gender, and sexual orientation under constitutional and statutory law on one
hand and a religious institution's First Amendment rights that include the
right to free exercise and the right to freedom of association on the other
hand.92 Should religious organizations be required to adhere to the same
anti-discrimination laws as other organizations, or do the religious
organizations' First Amendment rights exempt them from anti-
discrimination laws? 93 Opposing views exist on this question. One view is
that no one, not even religious organizations, should be exempt from civil
rights laws. 94 Another view is that religious groups should be exempt from
regulations that otherwise would coerce their members to violate their
90 AN ACT RELATIVE TO BULLYING IN SCHOOLS. S. 2404, (Mass. 2010); GLAD Equal
Justice Under Law, Massachusetts Rights of LGBT in Public Schools, 2, Oct. 2010, available at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/ma-rights-of-lgbt-students.pdf. Many of the
requirements of the Massachusetts anti-bullying law apply to all schools, whether public or private,
however, this law would not apply to the discrimination faced by the families. A school's
discriminatory admission policy would not fall under the definition of "bullying" as defined by the
Massachusetts statute.
91 Tex. Lab. Code § 21.051 (2002); Tex. Prop. Code § 301.021 et seq. (2002).
92 See Laura K. Klein, Rights Clash: How Conflicts Between Gay Rights and Religious Freedoms
Challenge The Legal System, 98 GEO. L.J. 505, 513-14 (2010); Martha Minow, Should Religious
Groups be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV 781, 781-82 (2007).
93 RONALD B. FLOWERS, MELISSA ROGERS, AND STEVEN K. GREEN, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
THE SUPREME COURT 96 (2008).
94 Klein, supra note 92, at 513-14; Minow, supra note 92, at 782.
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religious beliefs.95 The Supreme Court has at times ruled that a religious
organization's free exercise right may require the government to
accommodate a person's religious practice by exempting him or her from
the requirements of a particular law.96 On the other hand, the Court has also
made it clear that "not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional" and that
"the state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is
essential to accomplish an overriding government interest." 97 The
remainder of this Part focuses on the interplay between a parochial school's
First Amendment rights and a family's equality interests protected by anti-
discrimination laws or public policy arguments.
a. First Amendment Defenses to Suits Brought Under Anti
Discrimination Law
The parochial school's First Amendment affirmative defenses against an
anti-discrimination law challenge are the rights to Free Exercise and
Freedom of Association. Religious and other private organizations have
raised both affirmative defenses against challenges brought under anti-
discrimination laws.98
1. Parochial School's Free Exercise Defense
A parochial school is likely to argue that challenges under anti-
discrimination law burden its free exercise of religion. It is important to
note two points at the outset. First, the Supreme Court has drawn a
distinction between regulation of churches and regulation of religious
schools. The Court has found that interference in the affairs of religious
schools is less constitutionally problematic than interference with churches
because schools are not purely religious institutions, and the government
has a heightened interest in the area of education. 99 Second, under the free
exercise analysis set out in Employment Division v. Smith, anti-
discrimination laws are not directed at religion, but are valid and neutral
95 Id.
96 FLOWERS, supra note 93, at 96; See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944).
97 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1875) (holding that the free exercise interest of Mormons to practice polygamy was outweighed by
overriding state interests in keeping marriage between one man and one woman).
98 See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976); Boy Scouts of American v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 679 (2000).
99 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983) (citing Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973)); Michael Kavey, Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment Right to
Discriminate, 113 YALE L.J. 743, 782 (2003).
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laws of general applicability. 00 Therefore, in order for the parochial school
to succeed with a free exercise defense, it must demonstrate that it should
be exempt from the anti-discrimination law's general purview.
In the realm of parochial schools, the government has two interests:
education and equality. These two governmental interests must be weighed
against the school's free exercise interest. The weight of the government's
interest in promoting equality and education depends on two factors: the
form of equality sought and the person seeking the equality.
With the first factor, the weight of the government's interest compared to
the religious school's interest varies depending on whether the
classification is based on race, gender, sexual orientation, or some other
group. Martha Minow argues that history demonstrates that "religious
groups largely receive no exemptions from laws prohibiting race
discrimination, some exemptions from laws forbidding gender
discrimination, and explicit and implicit exemptions from rules forbidding
sexual orientation discrimination."101
The other factor to consider is the person seeking equal treatment from
the religious organization. Recently, the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor
Church v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission recognized a
"ministerial exception" to employment discrimination laws. This exception
effectively allows churches and other religious groups to choose and
dismiss their leaders without government interference;102 however, there is
no special protection that allows religious groups to discriminate against
those outside of the ministerial designation - including children and non-
ministerial staff.103
The combination of these two factors demonstrates that a parochial
school will not likely be able to assert a free exercise interest in the
exclusion of a minor child that will outweigh both the government and
100 Kavey, supra note 99, at 778; see Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(holding that where a law was not directed at religion, but was instead a "valid and neutral law of
general applicability," the right of free exercise "does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with such a law on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes or (proscribes)").
101 Minow, supra note 92, at 782.
102 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 706 (2012)
(explaining that the scope of the "ministerial exception" is designed to cover those employees that
preach the beliefs, teach the faith, and carry out the mission of the religious group); Adam Liptak,
Religious Groups Given 'Exception'to Work Bias Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan, 11, 2012, at A3.
103 Kavey, supra note 99, at 781, 782 (noting that the justification for discriminating in the hiring
of ministerial staff does not also apply to discrimination against students and non-ministerial staff,
because these people are not responsible for teaching the faith. The fact that their lifestyle is not
completely in accordance with the religious organization's beliefs does not compromises the religious
organizations' mission); see McCallum v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass'n, 824 F.Supp.2d 644, 651
(W.D.N.C. 2011).
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parental interest in equality in education.
2. Parochial School's Freedom of Association Defense
The freedom to associate is a right implied by the First Amendment's
freedom of speech provision.104 Most modem freedom of association cases
focus on whether the government can force organizations to accept
members they do not want.105 The Court in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees concluded that there were two prongs of the right to associate: the
right to engage in "intimate human relationships," and the right to associate
for expressive purposes.10 6 Most recently, the Supreme Court in Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale addressed whether the Boy Scout's decision to
terminate the adult membership of an openly gay Eagle Scout, James Dale,
on the grounds that the organization "specifically forbids membership to
homosexuals," was protected by the Boy Scout's right to associate for
expressive purposes. 107 James Dale brought suit against the Boy Scouts of
American under a New Jersey anti-discrimination law.l08 The Court found
that the Boy Scouts engaged in expressive association and that its
membership policy was protected by the First Amendment, thereby
exempting the Boy Scouts from the state anti-discrimination law. 109 Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing for the majority, gave deference to
the Boy Scout's assertion that Dale's inclusion in the organization would
significantly and adversely affect the Scout's message. 110 The Court's
decision in Dale was a major victory for advocates of freedom of
association and a major loss for advocates of expanding anti-discrimination
law.
If parochial schools are granted the same right to freedom of association
as the Court in Dale granted to the Boy Scouts, anti-discrimination claims
based on sexual orientation are likely to be losing battles.111 The Catholic
104 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 543 (2007); N.A.A.C.P. v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
105 See Boy Scouts of American v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000); see also Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
106 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
107 Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
108 Id. at 645 (noting that James Dale's complaint alleged that the Boy Scouts had violated New
Jersey's public accommodations statute and its common law by revoking Dale's membership based
solely on his sexual orientation).
109 Id. at 648-49; Kavey, supra note 99, at 749.
110 Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 ("The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the
group's freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the
group's ability to advocate public and private viewpoints."); Kavey, supra note 99, at 749.
111 Kavey, supra note 99, at 749 ("It is still unclear how broad Dale's reach will be. If it does
extend into the realm of private schools, the consequences for antidiscrimination laws and voucher
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Church has taken a strong stance against homosexuality, taking the position
that homosexual behavior is contrary to natural and divine law. 112
Parochial schools therefore have an argument that the forced inclusion of
homosexual people in their schools violates the schools' right of free
speech to express disapproval of homosexuality.
In order to overcome the parochial school's freedom of association
argument it is important to remember that the person being discriminated
against is not a homosexual, but rather the child of a homosexual. This fact
cuts against the parochial school's argument that accepting a child of
homosexual parents into the school prevents the school from advocating a
viewpoint on homosexuality. The child's presence in the school may put
teachers and administrators in an uncomfortable position when addressing
the topic of homosexuality; however, discomfort alone does not
significantly affect the school's ability to advocate its position on
homosexuality. If the presence of a child with homosexual parents in a
parochial school prevents the school from advocating against
homosexuality, then why are children of divorced or non-married parents
accepted into parochial schools? The Catholic Church admonishes divorce
and having children out of wedlock just as it does homosexuality.
Therefore, it is hard to give credence to a Catholic parochial school arguing
that forced inclusion of children of homosexual parents into the school
infringes upon its right to advocate against homosexuality - if such were
the standard, children of parents guilty of other sins would also be excluded
from the school.
III. REVOKING TAX-EXEMPT STATUS TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION
The District Court for the District of Columbia's 1970 decision in Green
v. Kennedy led the way for using the revocation of an organization's tax-
exempt status to combat discriminatory practices. 113 In Green, a three-
judge panel issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the I.R.S. from
according tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools in
Mississippi.11 4 Until 1970, the I.R.S. granted tax-exempt status to private
programs may be enormous."); Karen Lim, Freedom to Exclude After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale:
Do Private Schools Have a Right to Discriminate Against Homosexual Teachers?, 71 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2599, 2601 (2003).
112 CATHOLIC CHURCH, Catechism of the Catholic Church 566 (Pope John Paul II trans., United
States Catholic Conference eds., 2d ed. 2000); HOMOSEXUALITY, available at
http://www.catholic.com/library/Homosexuality.asp.
113 Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
114 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 578.
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schools regardless of the school's discriminatory admissions policies."15
However, in 1970 the I.R.S. reacted to the District Court's decision in
Green, and agreed that it would revoke the tax-exempt status of
organizations that had racially discriminatory practices. The I.R.S. sent a
letter to all private schools on November 30, 1970, notifying these schools
of the policy change at all levels of education.116
The Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States dealt with
challenges brought by Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian
Schools, two tax-exempt private schools, against the I.R.S.'s changed
policy.11 7 Both Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools
share the mission of fostering and promoting fundamental Christian
beliefs.11 8 At the time, both schools maintained the position that the Bible
justified segregated education.1 9 When the I.R.S. issued its November 30,
1970 letter informing private schools of its changed policy, both schools
sued the I.R.S. to have their tax-exempt status reinstated.120 Both cases
were appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which ruled in both cases that the
I.R.S. had the authority to revoke the schools' tax-exempt status.121 The
115 Id. at 577.
116 Id. at 578; The I.R.S. formally expressed this policy in a 1971 Revenue Ruling, providing that a
private school will only qualify for tax-exempt status if it has a racially non-discriminatory policy. Rev.
Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
117 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 579-80. Bob Jones University at the time was a non-profit
corporation located in Greenville, South Carolina that operated a school of 5,000 students from
kindergarten through college and graduate school. Goldsboro Christian Schools at the time was a
nonprofit corporation located in Goldsboro, North Carolina, that offered classes from kindergarten
through high school. Id at 583.
118 Id. at 580.
119 Id. Bob Jones University maintained the position that the bible forbad interracial dating and
marriage, and therefore in order to maintain same race dating and marriage, the University excluded
blacks from its school. In 1971 the University revised its policy and began to enroll black students,
however in doing so it also enacted a new disciplinary rule that prohibited interracial dating and
marriage. The rule provided, "[tihere is to be no interracial dating"' and students in violation of the
rule would be expelled. Id. at 580-81.
120 Id. at 581-82. Bob Jones University instituted an action in 1971 seeking to enjoin the I.R.S.
from revoking the school's tax-exempt status. Before reaching the Supreme Court in 1982, the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina held that revocation of the University's tax-
exempt status exceeded the delegated powers of the I.R.S., was improper under the I.R.S. ruling and
procedures, and was therefore a violation of the University's rights protected by the religion clauses of
the First Amendment. Goldsboro Christian Schools Goldsboro filed a suit seeking a refund for the taxes
it was required to pay, claiming that the school had been improperly denied § 501(c)(3) status. Id. at
584.
121 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 150-52 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing the District
Court's decision, concluding that § 501(c)(3) must be read against the background of charitable trust
law; that in order for an institution to eligible for an exemption under § 501(c)(3), that institution must
be "charitable" in the common law sense, and therefore must not be contrary to public policy. Because
the Court believed that Bob Jones University's racial policies violated a clearly established public
policy against racial discrimination, the University fell outside the common law definition of "charity"
and therefore was not covered by § 501(c)(3)); Goldsboro Christian Sch., Inc. v. U.S., 644 F.2d 879
(4th Cir. 1981) (affirming the Eastern District of North Carolina's holding that the school's racially
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Supreme Court granted certiorari for both Bob Jones University v. United
States and Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States in 1981 and
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision in both cases in a joint opinion.122
A. Requirements for an Organization to Receive Tax-Exempt Status under §
50 1(c)(3)
The Supreme Court's decision in Bob Jones University to uphold the
revocation of these two private religious school's tax-exempt status is
based on a reading of § 501(c)(3) that embraces the common law concept
of "charity."' 23 Pursuant to this concept of "charity," the Court interpreted
§ 501(c)(3) to embody two requirements. The first requirement explicitly
expressed in § 501(c)(3) is that the institution fit in to one of eight
categories set forth in the statute. 124 The second requirement is that the
institution's activities not be contrary to public policy.125 The schools
argued that only the first requirement was necessary, therefore if the
institution fell within one or more of the eight specific categories, the
institution automatically qualified for § 501(c)(3) status. 126 The Supreme
Court disagreed and supported the existence of the second requirement
through an analysis of the overall framework of the Internal Revenue Code
(hereinafter "I.R.C."). The Court acknowledged that the general words in §
501(c)(3) taken alone would support the schools argument, however, the
Court stated that taking such a narrow approach is not consistent with the
overall framework of the I.R.C.127 The Court found that the overall
framework of the I.R.C. reveals an unmistakable intent that the institution
seeking the tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be
contrary to public policy.128
discriminatory policies violated clearly established federal policy).
122 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585.
123 Id; Revenue Ruling 71-447.
124 See IRC § 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(viii); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585.
125 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585.
126 Id. at 585-86.
127 Id at 586.
128 Id. at 586-88. The Court looks to § 170, and points out that Congress used the list of
organizations in defining the term "charitable contributions." The Court further states that § 170 reveals
that Congress' intention was to provide tax benefits to organizations serving charitable purposes
because:
[T]he form of § 170 simply makes plain what common sense and history tells us: in enacting both § 170
and § 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the
development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of
public institutions of the same kind.
Id.
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a. Common Law Concept of Charity
The justification for providing charitable organizations with tax-
exemptions is rooted in the idea that charities provide a benefit to society -
this is referred to as the public benefit principle.129 The theory is that the
Government is able to deal with the loss of revenue because it is being
compensated; first, through the relief from financial burdens which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public funds, and
second, by the benefits that these charitable organizations provide society,
i.e., when students attend private schools, fewer government resources and
revenues are appropriated to the funding of public education.130
With an understanding of the theoretical underpinning for tax-
exemptions for charitable organizations, a corollary to the public benefit
principle becomes evident. Where an organization's activities are either
illegal or contrary to public policy, the public benefit principle breaks down
because that organization is no longer providing a public benefit to society,
thereby removing the government's incentive to provide a tax break.131
b. Racial Discrimination is contrary to Fundamental Public Policy
The next step in revoking an institution's tax-exempt status is to
demonstrate that the activity in question is in fact contrary to fundamental
public policy. The activity at question in Bob Jones University was racial
discrimination. In order for the Court to affirm the I.R.S.'s decision to
revoke the tax-exempt status of these schools, it had to find that racial
discrimination was against fundamental public policy. This was not a
difficult task considering that this case was decided in the wake of the civil
rights era. 132 The Court found that the school's activities were contrary to
fundamental public policy by paying "attention to the historical context, the
views of the other branches of government, and the dominant, though
hardly universal, trend in public views of what justice requires." 33 The
Court stated that "over the past quarter century, every pronouncement of
this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm
129 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 589-90.
130 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 589-90. This concept was
described in 1891 by Lord MacNaghten who in a restatement of English law of charity stated, "[c]harity
in its legal sense comprises four principle divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the
advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes
beneficial to the community. . . ."
131 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591-92.
132 See id. at 593 (stating that "there can no longer be any doubt that racial discrimination in
education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice.").
133 Minow, supra note 92, at 798.
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national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public
education. 134 Based upon the overwhelming case that racial discrimination
in public education is against fundamental national policy, the Court
concluded that educational institutions that practice racial discrimination do
not provide a public benefit to society, and are therefore not deserving of
"having all taxpayers share in their support by way of special tax status." 1 35
B. Extending the Principles ofBob Jones University to other Forms of
Discrimination
The Supreme Court's ruling in Bob Jones University was restricted to
racial discrimination by a private educational institution; the Court,
however, did not foreclose the possibility of applying the same approach to
combat other forms of discrimination. In order to declare an activity as
contrary to public policy, the Court found that there must be a strong
showing of a community conscience against that activity. Finally, this
community conscience should be evidenced by judicial treatment of the
issue, legislative enactments or executive action taken in response to the
issue. 136
a. Discrimination Against Children Based on his or her Parent's Sexual
Orientation is against Fundamental Public Policy
It must first be conceded that discrimination against a child of
homosexual parents when defined in narrow terms has little company in
history or within past legal discussion. However, when this form of
discrimination is approached with a broader perspective, it becomes
evident that this discrimination is really just another form of a child being
discriminated against because he or she is from a non-traditional family.
From this perspective, it becomes clear that discrimination against children
from non-traditional families is not isolated at all but rather has a long
history within our country. The Supreme Court and legislation has
addressed discrimination against children from non-traditional families in
the context of "non-marital" children and undocumented children.
134 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593.
135 Id. at 595.
136 See id. at 593-95 (pointing to Supreme Court decisions, Congressional enactments, and




1. Supreme Court Precedent
The fact that discrimination based upon a child's birth status is contrary
to public policy is well established in the Court's treatment of non-marital
children and undocumented children within Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence. Between 1968 and 1992 the Supreme Court adjudicated over
twenty cases involving equal protection claims of non-marital children, a
class of people disparagingly referred to as "illegitimate children."1 37 These
claims challenged the constitutionality of laws that denied non-marital
children equal rights in the areas of wrongful death damages, the rights of
fathers, financial assistance from state benefits, financial assistance from
federal benefits, inheritance, paternity and support actions, and
immigration.138 Claimants argued that the government did not have an
important interest in denying children of non-married parents the same
rights and benefits of children of married parents.
In 1968, the Supreme Court in Levy v. Louisiana dealt with whether a
non-marital child had the right to collect wrongful death damages after the
death of the mother.139 The Court concluded that it was "invidious to
discriminate against non marital children when no action, conduct or
demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the
mother." 40 In addressing the different treatment of non-marital children,
the Court proceeded to ask a series of rhetorical question, which are
relevant to this discussion. The Court posed the questions:
"[w]hen the child's claim of damage for loss of his mother is in
issue, why, in terms of "Equal Protection," should the tortfeasors go
free merely because the child is illegitimate? Why should the
illegitimate child be denied rights merely because of his birth out of
wedlock? He certainly is subject to all the responsibilities of a
citizen, including the payment of taxes and conscription under the
Selective Service Act. How under our constitutional regime can he
be denied correlative rights which other citizens enjoy?l 41
The Court's point in asking these questions is to establish that a child
regardless of how he or she was brought into this world is still a person,
and that just because they come from a non-traditional family does not
137 Zingo and Early, supra note 27, at 41; see Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created
Equal: A Proposal to Address Equal Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived
Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INTL. L.J. 208, 216 (2005).
138 Zingo and Early, supra note 27, at 41.
139 391 U.S. 68, 69-70 (1968).
140 Id. at 72.
141 Id. at 71.
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make them unworthy of equal protection.142
The underlying principle that discrimination against a child on account
of that child's parent(s) is a violation of public policy has also been
expressed in cases dealing with the unequal treatment of undocumented
children.14 3 In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether Texas could deny undocumented school-age children the free
public education that it provides to citizens and legally admitted aliens.144
The Court ultimately decided that the Equal Protection Clause did extend to
illegal aliens, and in reaching that conclusion, the Court expressed special
concern for the treatment of undocumented children. Specifically, the Court
classified the children in these actions as special members of this under
class of undocumented aliens. 145 The Court found persuasive the argument
that the state may withhold rights from those people whose presence in the
United States is the product of their own unlawful conduct; however, the
Court found that this same justification did not apply when the disabilities
are imposed on the minor children of illegal aliens.146 In strong language,
the Court stated "legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct
against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of
justice." 47 Emphasizing this point further, the Court stated,
"[Visiting] . . . condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical
and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the . . . child is
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and
penalizing the .. . child is an ineffectual-as well as unjust-way
of deterring the parent." 148
The Court's decision in Plyler did not define undocumented children as a
suspect class;149 however, it did highlight the dilemma of minor children
being disfavored on account of their parent's conduct. The Court ultimately
142 Id. at 70; Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977).
143 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
144 Id. at 205, 212. The Court's opinion focused mostly on whether the phrase within the Equal
Protection Clause "all persons within the territory of the United States" extended protection to non-
citizens and illegal aliens. Id. at 210.
145 Id. at 219.
146 Id. at 219-20.
147 Id. at 220.
148 Id. (citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
149 Id. at 221-23, (stating that "undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because
their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a 'constitutional irrelevancy' and
"undocumented status [is not] an absolutely immutable characteristic since it is the product of
conscious, indeed unlawful, action").
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held the Texas statute unconstitutional because it was directed against
children and imposed a discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal
characteristic over which children have little control.150
The Supreme Court's reasoning in this case rests on the same principle
that guided the Supreme Court in the non-marital children cases: children
should not be denied rights and benefits on account of conduct that is not
their own. This principle is an assertion that depriving some children access
to the rights, benefits, and protections that other children receive freely has
the more serious and long-term effect of stifling these children from having
an equal chance at success throughout the remainder of their lives.151 Based
on this principle, the fundamental public policy against discrimination of
children from non-traditional families emerges.
b. Legislative Enactments
In the wake of the Court's decisions in the area of non-marital children
and inheritance law, all state legislatures have alleviated the unsympathetic
treatment of non-marital children under intestacy law by amending statutes
to liberalize inheritance by non-marital children. Historically, a child born
out of wedlock was considered filius nullius, a child of no one, and could
not inherit from the father or mother.152 Eventually, states realized that
denying inheritance rights to a child innocent of any sin or crime was harsh
and pitiless.153 Today, all state legislatures permit a non-marital child to
automatically inherit from the mother.154 Inheritance from the father varies
between the states, but is usually permitted so long as certain paternity
requirements are met. 155
In the area of immigration law, Congress has made significant efforts to
protect children from being held responsible for the misdeeds of their
parent(s).15 6 Congress added a special provision to the Immigration and
150 Id. at 220.
151 See id. at 222 (stating that depriving an undocumented child access to public education has the
long term effect of hindering that child's of social, economic, intellectual, and psychological well-
being, and moreover it places an obstacle in the path of that child finding individual achievement); see
also Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
152 DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 115 (8th ed. 2009).
153 Id. at 115; Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
154 DUKEMINIER, supra note 152, at 115; Browne Lewis, Children of Men: Balancing the
Inheritance Rights of Maritial and Non-Maritial Children, 39 U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (2007).
155 DUKEMINIER, supra note 152, at 115-16. Most states permit paternity to be established by
evidence of the subsequent marriage of the parents, by acknowledgment by the father, by an
adjudication during the life of the father, or by clear and convincing proof after his death; see Browne
Lewis, Children of Men: Balancing the Inheritance Rights of Maritial and Non-Maritial Children, 39 U.
Tol. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2007).
156 See INA 101(a)(27)(J); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). The requirements for Special Immigrant
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Nationality Act that allows certain qualifying minors to petition for
immigrant status as a Special Immigrant Juvenile.157 An undocumented
child will qualify for this special status if the child can demonstrate
eligibility for long term foster care due to abuse, neglect or abandonment
by the child's parent or guardian.15 8 This special juvenile status represents
Congress's willingness to protect children who would be otherwise harmed
on account of their parent's conduct.
c. Discrimination Against a Child on Account of Child's Homosexual
Parents is the Same as Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children and
Undocumented Children
The specific scenario of a parochial school denying admission to a minor
child on account of that child's homosexual parents may be distinct from
other forms of discrimination discussed: however, from a public policy
standpoint, this discrimination presents essentially the same dilemma as
discussed in the area of non-marital and undocumented children: a child is
being disfavored on account of something that is out of his or her control.
The 10-year old child had no control over being born or adopted into a
homosexual family. Why should this child be denied the same
opportunities as a child born to heterosexual parents? This treatment of
undocumented and non-married children was deemed unconstitutional and
immoral, and there is no reason to treat this version of the same
discrimination any differently.
C. Standing Requirements for Suits Brought to Revoke a Parochial
School's Tax-exempt Status
In Bob Jones University, the challenge to the school's tax-exempt status
was brought by the I.R.S. and not a private claimant. The I.R.S. has the sole
authority to revoke a religiously-related educational institution's federal
tax-exempt status when it fails to adhere to certain rules, one of which
requires that the institution's purposes and activities may not be illegal or
violate fundamental public policy.159 Here, the I.R.S. should revoke the
Juvenile Status are 1) the juvenile must be under 21; 2) the juvenile must be unmarried; 3) the juvenile
must be present in the United States; 4) the juvenile must be deemed eligible by the juvenile court for
long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect or abandonment; and 5) a determination must be made
through an administrative or judicial proceeding that it would be in the best interest of the alien not to
be returned to his/her home country.
157 IRAJ. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 887 (1 Ith ed. 2008-09).
158 [NA 101(a)(27)(J); KURZBAN, supra note 157, at 888.
159 I.R.S., Tax Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations, 5, available at
http://www.irs.gov/publirs-pdflpl828.pdf. These rules include: 1) the organization's net earnings may
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parochial school's tax-exempt status because the school's discriminatory
practices violate fundamental public policy. However, if the I.R.S. does not
revoke an organization's tax-exempt status, a private party can attempt to
compel the I.R.S. to do so.
a. Suits Brought by Private Parties to Enjoin the I.R.S. From Granting a
Parochial School Tax-exempt Status
Where the I.R.S. does not revoke a parochial school's tax-exempt status,
the injured party might seek an injunction to prevent the I.R.S. from
granting the parochial school tax-exempt status. 160 Here, the plaintiffs
claim is directed at the federal government, because when the government
affords tax-exempt status to a discriminatory organization, the government
is not only condoning that discrimination but also indirectly funding its
continued practice.161
Two issues arise in these suits. The first issue is whether the I.R.C.
provides a private right of action by which private parties can challenge
another party's 501(c)(3) status. Assuming that the I.R.C. does provide a
private right of action, the second issue is whether a private party can
satisfy the standing requirements.
1. Private Rights of Action under the I.R.C.
Private rights of action to enforce law must be created by the federal or
state legislatures. 162 Conceivably, the injured party would assert that such a
private right is provided for under § 501(c)(3). This argument fails
however, because federal courts repeatedly have held that no federal tax
provision confers the right of private individuals to challenge an entity's
tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3).163
not inure to any private shareholder or individual; 2) the organization must not provide a substantial
benefit to private interests; 3) the organization must not devote a substantial part of their activities to
attempting to influence legislation; 4) the organization must not participate in, or intervene in, any
political campaign; and 5) the organization's purposes and activities may not be illegal or violate
fundamental public policy.
160 Russell J. Upton, Bob Jonesing Baden-Powell: Fighting the Boy Scouts of America's
Discriminatory Practices by Revoking its State-level Tax-exempt Status, 50 AM. U.L. REv. 793, 820
(2001).
161 Id at 820; Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 (1970).
162 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 578 (1979).
163 See Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 562, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (To the
extent that Plaintiffs seek to enforce any real or imagined rights created by § 501(c)(3), Plaintiffs lack
standing to do so); Selman v. Harvard Med. Sch., 494 F. Supp. 603, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding
student at foreign medical school lacked standing in attacking § 501(c)(3) status of domestic medical
school); 26 U.S.C.A. § 7401. This statute provides "No civil action for the collection or recovery of
taxes, or of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, shall be commenced unless the Secretary authorizes or
2013] 995
JOURNAL OF CIVLRIGHTS & ECONOAffCDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 26:4
There is a clear rationale for disallowing private rights of action in
challenge of a third party's tax-exempt status. The concern is that the
government's power to enforce tax liability will be displaced, and private
citizens will be able to use the federal judicial system as an arena for
challenging their neighbor's tax liability, essentially opening the floodgates
to overwhelm the federal courts. Justice Stewart expressed this concern
stating, "I cannot now imagine a case, at least outside the First Amendment
area, where a person whose own tax liability was not affected ever could
have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else." 64 The
Supreme Court in Bingler v. Johnson emphasized this point, stating that the
courts "do not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of
the tax laws. Congress has delegated to the Commission, not to the courts,
the task of prescribing 'all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement' of the Internal Revenue Code."1 65
In order to ensure a private right of action, the I.R.C. would have to be
amended to include a provision allowing private parties to challenge the
tax-exempt status of third parties.1 66 Because taxpayers, through taxation,
are forced to indirectly contribute to tax-exempt organizations, an
appropriate provision would allow for a taxpayer to challenge an
organization's 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status when the organization has a
policy or practice that is illegal or contrary to fundamental public policy.
2. Satisfying Article III Standing
In order for a federal court to have subject matter jurisdiction, the
plaintiff must satisfy the Constitution's Article III standing requirement.167
The Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife laid out a three part
test for determining whether private parties have standing to challenge the
I.R.S.168 First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"; second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
sanctions the proceedings and the Attorney General or his delegate directs that the action be
commenced." Id.
164 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
165 Binglerv. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750-51 (1969); 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a).
166 26 U.S.C. § 7428(a)(1)(A) is a declaratory judgment provision in the I.R.C., which allows
certain entities to dispute the Treasury Secretary's decision regarding their own initial or continuing
qualification for tax-exempt status. A plaintiff may mistakenly interpret this provision as a private right
of action, however, by definition, a plaintiff's claim under § 7428 will fail because the plaintiff is not
disputing its own qualification for tax-exempt status, but rather that of a third party. See, e.g., Fulani v.
Brady, 935 F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Indeed, the statutory scheme created by Congress is
inconsistent with, if not preclusive of, third party litigation of tax-exempt status.").
167 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
168 Lujan v. Defenders, 504 U. S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
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complained of - the injury has to be 'fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not the result of independent action of some
third party not before the court; and third, it must be 'likely,' as opposed to
merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable
decision."' 69 The Supreme Court in Allen v. Wright refined this test by
providing that the injury prong is satisfied where the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the injury resulted from I.R.S.'s failure to revoke the
organization's tax-exempt status. 170
The Supreme Court has most recently addressed the injury, causation,
and redressability requirements in Arizona Christian School Tuition
Organization v. Winn. 17l Here, a group of Arizona taxpayers challenged an
Arizona law that gives tax credits for contributions to school tuition
organizations, which then use the contributions to provide scholarships to
students attending private schools, including religious schools. 172 The
plaintiffs argued that standing existed because they had an interest in the
Government Treasury and because the allegedly unconstitutional
expenditure of Government funds would affect their personal tax
liability.173 The Court rejected this argument stating that absent special
circumstances, standing cannot be based on a plaintiffs mere status as a
taxpayer. 174
In cases of taxpayer standing, courts have found the injury, causation,
and redressability prongs to be lacking. The problem is that such claims
rest on unjustifiable economic and political speculation.1 75 To find injury, a
court must speculate "that elected officials will increase a taxpayer-
169 Id.; see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976) (stating that "the
'case or controversy' limitation of Art. 111 still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that
fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the
independent action of some third party not before the court."); see generally U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2
(citing to the case and controversy requirement).
170 Allen, 468 U.S. at 756-57.
171 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
172 Id. at 1440. The plaintiffs claimed that the Arizona statute violated the Establishment clause
because it allows school tuition organizations to use State income-tax revenues to pay tuition for
students at religious schools. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1089 (West Supp. 2010). Section 43-1089
allows Arizona taxpayers to obtain dollar-for-dollar tax credits of up to $500 per person and $1,000 per
married couple for contributions to STOs. § 43-1089(A).
173 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1438.
174 Id. at 1439 (stating "[tihis Court has rejected the general proposition that an individual who has
paid taxes has a "continuing, legally cognizable interest in ensuring that those funds are not used by the
Government in a way that violates the Constitution.").
175 Id. at 1440; see Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). The "effect upon future
taxation, of any payment out of funds," was too "remote, fluctuating and uncertain" to give rise to a
case or controversy. And the taxpayer-plaintiff's "interest in the moneys of the Treasury," the Court
recognized, was necessarily "shared with millions of others." Id.
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plaintiffs tax bill to make up a deficit."1 76 Moreover, courts have found
that plaintiffs' alleged injury is not fairly traceable to the tax-exempt status
of a third party.177 With regard to the causation requirement, the Court in
Winn stated that "a finding of causation would depend on the additional
determination that any tax increase would be traceable to the tax credits, as
distinct from other governmental expenditures or other tax benefits." 78
Even more problematic, to find redressability, a court must assume that,
where a remedy is granted, the taxpayer would receive some actual tax
relief. It would be "pure speculation" to conclude that an injunction against
a tax benefit "would result in any actual tax relief' for a taxpayer-
plaintiff.179
b. The Flast Exception
The Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen carved out a narrow exception
from the general rule that a plaintiffs status as a taxpayer is not sufficient
to establish standing in federal court. 8 0 The exception provides that
taxpayers may have standing where two conditions are met.181 First, there
must be a "logical link" between the "plaintiffs taxpayer status and the
type of legislative enactment attacked."1 82 Second, there must be a "nexus"
between the plaintiffs taxpayer status and the "precise nature of the
constitutional infringement alleged." 83
In Flast, the plaintiffs, federal income taxpayers, brought suit in federal
court alleging that the expenditure of federal funds to finance instruction in
religious schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.184 The Court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the first
176 Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006).
177 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (dismissing a challenge by
patients to a hospital's tax-exempt status for lack of standing because it was too speculative whether the
hospital would have provided free care to plaintiffs, even if required to provide more charity care in
exchange for its tax-exemption); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984) ("The line of causation
between that conduct and desegregation of respondents' schools is attenuated at best.").
178 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1440. The "respondents could not establish that an injunction against the tax
credit would prompt Arizona legislators to 'pass along the supposed increased revenue in the form of
tax reductions."' Id.
179 Id (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 614 (1989)). In order for the plaintiff to
satisfy the redressability requirement, she would have to establish that an injunction against application
of the STO tax credit would prompt Arizona legislators to "pass along the supposed increased revenue
in the form of tax reductions." Id
180 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 84 (1968); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988).
181 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102; Winn, No. 09-987, slip op. at 22.
182 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102; Winn, No. 09-987, slip op. at 22.
183 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102; Winn, No. 09-987, slip op. at 23.
184 Flast, 392 U.S. at 85-86. The expenditures were directed by Congress under Congress under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
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condition because their allegation was that the federal government violated
the Establishment Clause in the exercise of its legislative authority to both
collect and spend tax dollars.185 The Court also found that the second
condition was met because a nexus existed between the plaintiff s status as
a taxpayer and the allegation that government funds were spent on an
outlay for religion in contravention of the Establishment Clause.186
The Court's finding that the plaintiffs satisfied Article III's standing
requirements was based on a specific constitutional limitation of
Congress's taxing and spending power. The Court found that the
Establishment Clause "specifically limit[s] the taxing and spending power
conferred by Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, and where such
specific limitations exist, a taxpayer has a clear stake in assuring that those
constitutional limits are not breached by Congress.187 The Flast decision is
limited to Establishment Clause violations, but left open the question of
whether the Constitution contained other specific limits on Congress's
taxing and spending power. 188 Since Flast, the "Court has 'declined to
lower the taxpayer standing bar in suits alleging violation of any
constitutional provision apart from the Establishment Clause. "'189
In Winn, the plaintiffs argued that standing was satisfied under the Flast
exception because the STO tax credit should be understood as a
government expenditure. The Court's majority rejected this argument and
explained that tax credits are not equivalent to government expenditures.190
Although the majority acknowledged that "tax credits and government
expenditures ... have similar economic consequences," it distinguished the
two on the basis that tax credits do not "implicate individual taxpayers in
sectarian activities." 191 The Court explained that unlike government
expenditures where a "dissenter whose tax dollars are 'extracted and spent'
185 Winn, No. 09-987, slip op. at 11.
186 Id. at 23.
187 Flast, 392 U.S. at 105-06.
The taxpayer's allegation in such cases would be that his tax money is being extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power. Such an injury
is appropriate for judicial redress, and the taxpayer has established the necessary nexus between his
status and the nature of the allegedly unconstitutional action to support his claim of standing to secure
judicial review.
Id. at 106.
188 See id. at 105 ("Whether the Constitution contains other specific limitations can be determined
only in the context of future cases. However, whenever such specific limitations are found, we believe a
taxpayer will have a clear stake as a taxpayer in assuring that they are not breached by Congress.").
189 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1445 (quoting Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587,
609 (2007) (plurality opinion)).
190 See id. at 1447.
191 Id.
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knows that he has in some small measure been made to contribute to an
establishment in violation of conscience," with tax credits, "there is no such
connection between [the] dissenting taxpayer and [the] alleged
establishment." 192
Although the Court's decision addressed a challenge to a tax-credit, and
not a tax-exemption, it is likely that the Court would have similarly decided
that a tax-exemption to a parochial school is not a government expenditure.
Tax-exemptions, along with tax credits, deductions, and exclusions are
special tax mechanisms designed to indirectly finance certain social, fiscal,
and economic policy initiatives. 193 Whether this indirect financing amounts
to a government expenditure is dealt with through the "tax expenditure
analysis" created by Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of Treasury
during the 1960s.194 Surrey's "tax expenditure analysis" starts by drawing a
line between taxpayers and non-taxpayers. 195 The distinction amounts to
whether the entity exists for the purpose of generating income or for
serving some social welfare service - i.e., religious, charitable, educational,
and scientific organizations.1 96 Accordingly, organizations that exist to
provide some social welfare service, and not to generate income, are not
considered taxpayers. 197 These organizations "are not considered part of
the 'natural' tax base because they have no income to subject to
taxation," 98 and because they have no income in the first place, "they are
not really being 'exempted' from paying income tax."199
Conversely, the § 170 contribution deduction granted to those that
192 Id,
193 See NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE
FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 103 (2011); see, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, Article, Increasing Tax
Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations: A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2004)
(examining the tax incentives, such tax deductions, designed to encourage people to donate
conservation easements and suggesting increasing these tax incentives so as to further such donations).
194 See CRDIM & WINER, supra note 193, at 103. "The debate over whether tax exemptions and
deductions are the equivalent of tax subsidies has [existed] for many years . . . ." Id. at 103. The
argument on one side is that "tax-exemptions and subsidies are equivalent." Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 43 (1989). "Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifyring
taxpayers, forcing them to become 'indirect and vicarious donors."' Id. at 14. On the other side, the
argument follows that "[b]y perpetually declining to impose taxes on nonprofits, government targets
only general classes of organizations, not particular entities, and only 'passively' assists them." CRIMM
& WINER, supra note 193, at 106.
195 CRIMM & WINER, supra note 193, at 105.
196 See id. at 105-06.
197 See id. at 100-01.
198 Id. at 106.
199 Id. The reasoning advanced to support the distinction between tax-exemptions and government
expenditures "comports with the idea that government's 'simple' abstention from imposing taxes, and
hence its foregoing receipt of tax revenue, is formally different qualitatively from government's giving
as direct grants public funds 'exacted from taxpayers as a whole."' Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
New York, 397 U.S. 664, 690 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring)).
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contribute to 501(c)(3) organizations is treated as a tax subsidy to the
contributing individual. The reason for this different treatment is that the
contributing individual is a part of the "natural" tax base because he or she
generates income. Therefore when the government offers the § 170
deduction, it is choosing to forego tax revenue that it otherwise could
collect from a claimant taxpayer who unquestionably is part of the
"natural" federal income tax base." 200
c. Standing Argument under Allen v. Wright
The Court's decision in Winn appears to foreclose a plaintiffs ability to
use the Flast exception to gain standing in federal court to challenge a
federal tax credit or exemption as a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Although the Court's decision serves a major blow to taxpayer standing,
there may remain some room to maneuver. In Winn the Court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument for standing because the plaintiffs based their claim for
standing on the sole basis that they were Arizona taxpayers. 201 Where a
plaintiff can allege a more cognizable injury, it is possible that courts may
reach a different conclusion. 202
In Allen v. Wright, the Supreme Court addressed the standing issue in a
case brought by parents of African American children attending public
schools during the desegregation era. 203 The parents challenged the I.R.S.'s
grant of tax-exempt status to discriminatory private schools across the
country, claiming that the I.R.S.'s failure to deny tax-exempt status to these
private schools thwarted the desegregation effort in the public schools.
Consequently, they argued, the I.R.S.'s failure injured their children. 204
The parent's theory was that so long as private schools were permitted to
continue discriminatory practices, the desegregation efforts in public
schools would be undermined because white families that resisted
desegregation could simply send their children to discriminatory private
200 See id. at 105, 108. The reduction in tax liability enjoyed by the donating taxpayer under
section 170 acts as a direct government grant or subsidy to the donating taxpayer and is therefore
treated as a tax expenditure.
201 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011).
202 Id. ("Some plaintiffs may demonstrate standing based on the direct harm of what is claimed to
be an establishment of religion, such as a mandatory prayer in a public school classroom. See School
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224, n. 9 (1963). Other plaintiffs may
demonstrate standing on the ground that they have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on account
of their religion. Those costs and benefits can result from alleged discrimination in the tax code, such as
when the availability of a tax-exemption is conditioned on religious affiliation. See Texas Monthly, Inc.
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (plurality opinion).").
203 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739-40 (1984).
204 Id.
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schools.205 The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to show how the
I.R.S.'s grant of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools
across the country resulted in their children's direct personal injury.206 The
Court stated that a finding of actual injury could only have been found for
"'persons who [were] personally denied equal treatment" by the challenged
discriminatory conduct."207 Because the Court failed to find an inquiry
fairly traceable to the alleged illegal conduct of the I.R.S., it never reached
the redressability prong.208
In McGlotten v. Connally, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that a plaintiff challenging the tax-exempt status
of an organization satisfied both the injury, and redressability requirements
of standing.209 The plaintiff, McGlotten alleged that the funds generated by
such tax benefits enabled segregated fraternal orders to maintain their racist
membership policies, and that such benefits constituted endorsements of
blatantly discriminatory organizations by the federal government." 210 The
main difference between this case and Allen is that here, McGlotten was
able to allege a clear injury.2 11 Unlike in Allen, McGlotten's claim
stemmed from an actual injury-he was denied membership in Local Lodge
#142 of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks solely because of his
race. 212
In the case of a child who is denied admissions to a parochial school
because his/her parent(s) are homosexual, there are arguments that the
standing requirements should be satisfied. An actual injury exists because
the child was a victim of the parochial school's discriminatory practice.
The family should allege that the funds generated by tax benefits enable the
parochial school to maintain its discriminatory practices. The alleged injury
here is "fairly traceable" to the school's tax-exempt status. The federal
government's grant of tax benefits to a discriminatory organization serves
as an endorsement of the discriminatory behavior and therefore condones
205 Id. at 746. The plaintiffs alleged that because contributions to discriminatory private schools are
deductible from income taxes under §§ 170(a)(1) and (c)( 2) of the Internal Revenue Code, these
"deductions facilitate the raising of funds to organize new schools and expand existing schools in order
to accommodate white students avoiding attendance in desegregating public school districts." Id.
206 Id. at 753.
207 Id at 755; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1972) (holding that
the plaintiff had no standing to challenge a club's racially discriminatory membership policies because
he had never applied for membership).
208 Allen, 468 U.S. at 759 n.24; Upton, supra note 10, at 824-25.
209 McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448,452 (D.D.C. 1972).
210 Id.
211 Upton, supra note 10, at 825.
212 McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 450.
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the continuation of the discriminatory practice. The redressability prong
should also be satisfied because the revocation of a parochial school's tax-
exempt status will likely encourage the school to conform to the norms of
fundamental public policy in order to regain its tax-exempt status.
1. Congress Should Adopt Regulations that will Compel the I.R.S. to
Affirmatively Revoke an Organization's Tax-exempt Status Where
that Organization's Policies and Practices Violate Fundamental Public
Policy
Notwithstanding the potential arguments to achieve standing for claims
against a third party's tax-exempt status, current jurisprudence indicates a
strong likelihood that such claims will make it before federal courts. 213 In
recognizing these limitations, the path forward should focus on tightening
the I.R.S.'s enforcement of discriminatory tax-exempt organizations. If
private parties cannot obtain standing in federal court to challenge a third-
party's tax status, then the I.R.S. should be compelled to play a greater role
in ensuring that these organizations are not running afoul of the common
law concept of "charity." The most practical solution is for Congress to
enact legislation that will prompt the I.R.S. to exercise greater scrutiny over
organizations that receive and maintain tax-exempt status, and compel the
I.R.S. to affirmatively revoke an organization's tax-exempt status in the
event that an organization continues policies or practices that violate
fundamental public policy.
D. Free Exercise Defense against Challenges to Revoke the Parochial
School's Tax-exempt Status
In the event that the I.R.S. decides to revoke a parochial school's tax-
exempt status, the school will likely raise a Free Exercise defense under the
First Amendment. The Free Exercise defense is unique in this area because
the denial or revocation of a tax-exempt status is not the equivalent of the
state prohibiting the right to exercise a religious belief as the loss of tax-
exempt status will not prevent the parochial school from observing its
religious tenets. Thus, the free exercise question is whether the state's
interest in prohibiting the discrimination of children of homosexual
families outweighs the burden that the denial of tax benefits places on the
213 The fact that the I.R.C. does not provide an express private right of action to challenge the tax
liability of a third party, combined with a private party's unlikely chance of satisfying the standing
requirements, makes this avenue improbable.
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parochial school's right to free exercise. 214 In Bob Jones University the
Court ruled that the state's interest in eradicating racial discrimination
outweighed any burden that these schools would be faced with as a result
of having their tax-exempt status revoked. 215 The question here is whether
courts would reach the same result where the discriminatory practice is
against children of non-traditional families instead of racial discrimination.
The answer requires a balancing of the government's interest in
eradicating discrimination of children from non-traditional families and the
parochial school's interest in maintaining its tax-exempt status. In Bob
Jones University the Court found the government's interest compelling and
therefore concluded that the schools' interest was outweighed. The
discussion in Part II. B. 1 of this Note demonstrates that the government
has an interest in eradicating discrimination of children from non-
traditional families.216 Based on the Supreme Court's classification of non-
marital children as a suspect class, and federal and state legislation that
protects non-marital children and undocumented children, there is a strong
argument that the government has a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against children of non-traditional families.217
IV. PROPOSAL FOR NEW FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The most complete solution for challenging the parochial school is new
legislation that includes children of non-traditional families as a protected
class under federal anti-discrimination law. Ideally, this legislation would
amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by adding children of non-traditional
families to the list of protected groups. This proposal represents the best
way to eliminate, or at least inhibit, parochial schools from discriminating
against children of homosexual parents for three reasons. First, federal law
would provide a uniform approach across the country to fighting a
discriminatory parochial school. Individual state or local law may protect a
family in some circumstances, but the goal is for all families across the
country to have uniform legal recourse. Second, when families bring claims
under this statute against a parochial school, they would have a strong
chance of overcoming the school's First Amendment defenses. 218 The
school would not be able to make a sound argument that the forced
214 See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
215 Id,
216 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
217 See discussion supra Part I.
218 See discussion infra Part I.A.1.
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inclusion of these children into its school infringes on its free speech and
free exercise rights. Third, without a statutory right, children have
difficultly gaining standing to enjoin the I.R.S. to revoke a discriminatory
parochial school's tax-exempt status.219 If a child is protected by a federal
statute, there is a better chance that the child can prompt the I.R.S. to enjoin
a school's tax-exempt status by demonstrating that a federal statute was
violated.
This legislation would serve the greater purpose of protecting children
from all types of non-traditional families. The purview of this protection
would ensure that children with divorced parents, unmarried parents, foster
parents, disabled parents, or imprisoned parents will not be treated
differently because they are not from the traditional family. Discrimination
of children from any of these families is wrong, and this legislation should
serve to prevent it.
CONCLUSION
Currently, a family impacted by a parochial school's decision to deny
admission to children on account of that child's gay or lesbian parent(s) has
limited legal recourse. The legal implications of a private religious school
discriminating against children of homosexual parents are complex. First,
private actors are not governed by constitutional law; therefore, a family's
equal protection, substantive due process, or free exercise claims are not
available. Second, the discriminatory act is unique; the discrimination is
based on account of homosexuality, but the victim of the discrimination is a
child who is not homosexual. Third, where statutory law exists to protect
homosexuals, it is incomplete. Finally, the discriminatory actor is a
religious organization that has First Amendment rights to free exercise and
freedom of association. So how can an injured party navigate these
obstacles in order to find a just result? This Note has demonstrated that the
law currently fails to provide protection. The road ahead offers signs that
homosexuals will gain greater equality within our society. Indicators
specifically include the recent repeal of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," and
constitutional challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act.220 If and when
the day comes, families that are harmed by this type of discrimination may
219 See discussion supra Part II.C.I.a.
220 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see Charlie
Savage and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, US. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb.
23, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/24marriage.html? r-2; see Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Obama Signs Away 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell', N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military.html.
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find relief through federal or state anti-discrimination law. However, the
question remains, why should an innocent child have to wait until
homosexuals receive complete equality in this country before he or she can
have the same rights and benefits as a child born into a traditional family?
This issue presents more than just discrimination against homosexuals. It
involves an important public policy concern for innocent children being
denied the same rights of children born into a traditional family.
In response to the current inability of constitutional and statutory law to
protect families from this form of discrimination, this Note has proposed
two alternative solutions. The first alternative is to seek the revocation of a
discriminatory parochial school's tax-exempt status. The Supreme Court's
decision in Bob Jones University demonstrated how a religious
organization's discriminatory practice can be challenged through this
approach. When a church or religious organization is granted tax-exempt
status by the federal government, that organization must adhere to the
common law definition of a charity. When the activities of that
organization contradict fundamental public policy, that organization is no
longer worthy of receiving tax-exemption because that organization is no
longer providing a public benefit. The parochial schools that deny
admission to innocent children on account of the child's homosexual
parents violate a public policy against discriminating against a child of a
non-traditional family. Revoking the tax-exempt status of a parochial
school does not directly prohibit the school's right to continue its
discriminatory practice, however, it sends messages that the community
does not support the school's practices and the government will not support
the organization with tax-exemptions so long as the discriminatory
practices continue.
The second and more complete solution is a proposal for new federal
legislation. Legislation that includes children of non-traditional families as
a protected class under federal anti-discrimination law would provide
uniform protection to families throughout the country. Defining the
protected class as children of non-traditional families is important because
it takes the focus away from the child's parents' behavior, and emphasizes
that a child should not be singled out for being born or adopted into a
particular family. This type of legislation is idealistic, but in order to
adequately address this problem its enactment is essential.
From a legal, moral, and theological standpoint, this issue represents a
glaring violation of fundamental public policy. Congress must take action
to ensure that innocent children are not being harmed within our society on
account of their parent's lifestyle. Congress has responded before with
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legislation directed at curbing discriminatory practices, and it is time for it
to respond again.

